Intel VT-x and VT-i overview
Issues with traditional VMM designs

- **Ring deprivileging:**
  - A technique that runs all guest software at a privilege level greater than 0.
  - 0/1/3 model: guest OS runs at level 1
    - Can’t be used for IA-32 processors in 64-bit mode
  - 0/3/3 model: guest OS runs at level 3
    - Level 3 shared with apps
    - → Ring compression

- **Ring aliasing:**
  - Problems due to not running a guest OS at its intended privilege level
  - Guest OS can tell it is not at level 0
Issues with traditional VMM designs

- **Address space compression**
  - VMM needs to occupy part of the guest’s virtual address space
  - How to protect this part of virtual address space from guest?

- **Non-faulting accesses to privileged state**
  - Some accesses to privileged resources do not fault
  - E.g. LGDT, LIDT, LLDT etc will fault,
  - But SGDT, SIDT, SLDT etc will not fault

- **System calls**
  - SYSENTER will transition to ring 0, where VMM executes
  - SYSEXIT will fault if executed outside ring 0
  - Can end up with too many transitions via VMM at ring 0
Issues with traditional VMM designs

- **Interrupt virtualization**
  - Guest attempts to control interrupt masking will fault due to ring deprivileging
  - That is fine, BUT
  - Guest OSes frequently mask/unmask interrupts.
  - So it’s a big performance overhead
  - VMM intervention not needed for all such accesses

- **Hidden state problem**
  - Some processor state hidden from all software
    - Not accessible via registers
    - E.g. hidden descriptor caches
  - Not a problem if only a single OS executes
  - BUT, for better performance, one may want to save this hidden state when switching between guest OSes
VTx and VTi Overview
VT-x:
Ring Aliasing and Ring Compression

- Applications execute in ring 3
- Guest OS executes deprivileged in ring 0
- VMM executes in a new mode with highest privilege
VT-x: Two operating modes

- VMX root operation:
  - Fully privileged mode for VMM execution

- VMX non-root operation:
  - Not fully privileged, intended for guest OS
  - Deprivileges guest OS without using up rings for the VMM

- These modes are orthogonal to rings
VT-x: VM Entry and VM Exit

- New Data Structure: Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS)
  - Guest State Area
  - Host State Area
  - Analogous in some respects to Task State Structure (TSS) for processes and used during context switches.

- VM Entry:
  - Transfers control from VMM to guest
  - Via two instructions:
    - VMLAUNCH on first entry
    - VMRESUME on subsequent entries
  - Loads processor state from guest state area in VMCS

- VM Exit:
  - Transfer control from guest to VMM
  - Via VMEXIT instruction
  - Save processor state to guest state area in VMCS
  - Load VMM state from the host state area in VMCS
VT-x: Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS)

- One control structure per virtual processor
- Located in physical memory

- Contains control information for
  - VM execution
  - EXIT conditions and exit information
  - ENTRY conditions

- VMCS format not defined (?)
  - Perhaps dependent on the implementation of hypervisor
**VT-i: Two operating modes**

- Determined by PSR.vm (processor status register)
  - PSR.vm = 0 ➔ VMM operation
  - PSR.vm = 1 ➔ Guest operation

- Controls the number of virtual address bits available to the guest OS.
  - Uppermost address bit not available to guest OS
  - ➔ gives VMM a dedicated virtual address space

- Mode switching:
  - Access to privileged resources by the guest software results in **intercepts** to the VMM. (similar to VM Exit in VT-x)
  - Privileged resources: TLB, Privileged registers (PSR, control), etc.

- Virtual Processor Descriptor
  - One per virtual processor
  - Similar purpose to VMCS in VT-x
Solutions to virtualization challenges
Address space compression

- VT-x
  - Two additional modes mean that guest OS can run at level 0 in non-root mode
  - But does VMM’s code still map to guest address space?

- VT-i
  - PSR.vm bit serves a similar purpose
  - VMM has a virtual address bit that guest software cannot use
Ring aliasing

- Allows VMM to run at its intended privilege level
  - Ring 0
  - VT-x → in non-root mode
  - VT-i → with PSR.vm set to 1
Non-faulting access to privileged state

- Two mechanisms
  - Support to have such instructions fault to VMM
    - No more scanning and patching needed!
  - Support that causes the state to become unimportant to VMM
    - E.g. GDT/LDT/IDT operations in IA-32
System calls

- Guest runs at level 0

- So SYSENTER/SYSEXIT transition via VMM not required
Interrupt virtualization

- Ability to control instructions and events that cause VM exits

- VT-x
  - External interrupt exiting control
    - When set, all external interrupts cause VM exits.
    - Guest unable to mask these interrupts
  - Interrupt window exiting
    - VM exit occurs whenever guest software is ready to receive interrupts

- VT-i
  - Virtualization acceleration field
    - Can allow/prevent guest from controlling interrupt masking
    - Reduce transitions to VMM on each access to interruption control registers.
  - Virtualization disable field
    - Allows VMM to disable virtualization of a particular instruction or resource.
    - Reduces the number of intercepts that VMM handles
Access to hidden state

- VT-x
  - Guest state area of VMCS includes hidden state information

- VT-i
  - Similar mechanisms to save necessary hidden state information
Other more recent features

- Extended Page Tables
  - Support for nested paging
  - Guest controls first-level page table which provides virtual to "Guest-physical" mappings
  - VMM controls EPT: Guest-physical to machine-physical mappings

- Virtual Processor IDs
  - To tag TLB entries
  - Avoids TLB flush on each VM Entry and VM Exit